The problem of evil may be characterized as the problem of how precisely to specify a property, P, about which it is possible for a morally sensitive man to believe that (i) a person who possesses it would be morally justified on that account in not preventing instances of intense innocent suffering and (2) it is neither impossible nor unlikely that if there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, he possesses it. Atheists have typically claimed that P cannot be precisely specified. Moreover, they have maintained that in view of our inability to give a precise specification of P, it is irrational to believe that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being who is perfectly good and, hence, irrational to believe that God exists. In the remainder of this paper, I want to discuss the question whether there is any good reason for believing that this latter thesis is true.' If there is no such reason, then no matter how much he may busy himself with an attempt at formulating a precise specification of P, the theist can be justifiably contented with the thought that it doesn't much matter whether he succeeds.
to prevent the s and (ii) the innocent sufferer is a person to whom he does not have the above-mentioned special obligations, and (b) X is not directly confronted with the innocent sufferer's plea for help;' or (4) X has a justified belief that it is highly likely that preventing the s would inevitably result in suffering at least as great either for the people to whom he has the special obligations mentioned in (3) (a) or for innocent people to whom X does not have the special obligations mentioned there. Call these justi fications 71, 2, J3 and J4 respectively. Now we have good reason to believe that none of these justifications is applicable to God. J2's applicability to God is plainly incompatible with God's omniscience. And God's omnipotence entails that Ji does not fit his case. 31 is not applicable to God since an omnipotent being is able to do anything such that it is not necessarily false that he does it, and it is not neces sarily false that God prevents s's. Or, at any rate, the proposition that God prevents s's appears not to to be necessarily false and, hence, there would be an onus of proof on anyone who claimed that it is necessarily false to show that this appearance is misleading. (It is irrational to impute necessary falsehood to a proposition which appears to be contingent in the absence of a proof that it is not really contingent.) Moreover, the proposition that God prevents s's without seriously inconveniencing anyone or bringing about further suffering also appears not to be necessarily false. And, of course, if God can prevent s's without the envisaged disvaluable consequences ensuing, then he knows that this is so. It follows that we have grounds for holding that God's omnipotence and omniscience are incompatible with his being justified in not preventing s's by 3 and 74.
Evidently, then, the theist needs to maintain that it is plausible that .... J4 do not exhaust the justifications which any rational being might have for not preventing an s. More specifically, he needs to maintain that it is rational to hold that God possesses some property, P, other than the properties referred to by 1. The objection in brief is that anyone who accepts T is committed to the conclusion that it may be, for all he knows, that any human being who fails to prevent an s possesses a property which defeats the claim that he has M. If this is correct, then since most theists believe that they are sometimes justified in holding that a human being has M (namely, when he fails to prevent an s and none of 31. . .J7 fits his case), it is not open to most theists to accept T. Is the objection sound? There are a number of responses which the advocate of T might make to it. (I) We can rule out the thesis that there is at least one property, P, possessed by human beings, which is not referred to by any of . .. . J4 and yet which justifies us in not preventing s's, by examining all the properties which human beings possess and finding that in fact none except those referred to by ... 74 counts as a justification for not preventing s's. (2) We can know that human beings do not possess P in the way that we know, e.g. that human beings do not have horns. We are entitled to believe that if human beings possessed P (or had horns) then at least some people would have observed that this is so (either directly or by observing evidence that it is so); and we are further entitled to believe that no one has made these observations. (3) Though we do not have empirical knowledge that human beings do not possess P, we have a priori knowledge that they do not, i.e. we know that it is necessarily false that human beings ever possess P.
But in fact all of these responses are of questionable plausibility. Regarding (i), it is surely highly dubious that we are fully acquainted with all the properties which human beings possess. And (2) can be called into question on the ground that P is insufficiently specified to enable us to tell whether, given that human beings possessed it, at least some people would have directly observed that a human being possesses P or would have observed evidence that this is so. (This is not true of the property of having horns.) It might be said here that we do in fact have observational evidence that human beings do not possess P since (a) M is invariably observed in cases in which a human person, X, fails to prevent an s and none of il.. . 34 is applicable to him and (b) this would not be so if human beings sometimes possessed P. But the trouble with this claim is that it leaves unanswered the question how we know that X possesses M (that we 'observe' M) in the envisaged cases. Plainly the following argument is circular and hence entirely unpersuasive: 'We are entitled to believe that X does not possess P in the envisaged cases because we are entitled to believe that X possesses M in those cases; and we are entitled to believe the latter because we are entitled to believe that X does not possess P in the cases under discussion.' (3) is, perhaps, a more plausible response, but it is none the less subject to doubt. God is a person about whom the advocate of T alleges that he possesses P. So we are entitled to ask the advocate of T for an explanation of why it should not be necessarily false that that person possesses P even though it is necessarily false that other (non-divine) persons do so. That is to say, we are entitled to ask for an analysis of the difference between the nature (or concept) of God and the nature (or concept) of men in virtue of which it is possible for the former person, but not for the latter people, to possess P. And it is reasonable to believe that no such analysis is avail able to mortals -especially in view of the fact that P is not precisely specified. The unavailability of this analysis is not, perhaps, a conclusive reason for rejecting (3). But it constitutes a ground for viewing (3) with suspicion.
Another reply to the envisaged objection to T is as follows:
By 'a B-belief of X' let us mean 'a belief which it would be irrational for X not to hold'.1 And suppose that X fails to prevent a certain s. Now it is not sufficient for refuting the claim that X has M merely to cite the fact that abolishing the s would result in some such 
Call the thesis that God is justified in not preventing s's because he has the envisaged B-belief T'. The claim that it is rational to believe that T' is true entails T. For the disvaluable
states of affairs referred to by T' are not precisely specified. (Even after they have been described as (i) and (2), we are still in the dark as to their precise nature.) Now a person who accepts T' is very plainly not committed to the conclusion that we are never justified in ascribing M to anyone. For the states of affairs referred to by T' are ones about which human beings know that they do not have B-beliefs that those states of affairs would be brought about by the abolishing of s's; and, as has been said, a human being, X, cannot be justified in not preventing an s just on the ground that in fact X's abolishing it would inevitably lead to a further disvaluable state of affairs; the latter fact must be coupled with the fact that X has a B-belief about it.
Of Theists who do find this thesis plausible on the face of it ought to admit that, in view of its prima facie correctness, there is an onus of proof on them to show that, appearances to the contrary, it is false. One way to show that it is false is to set out a cogent demonstration that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being who is perfectly good.2 But (as many theists will concede) it is doubtful that this can be done. And the only alternative way of shouldering the burden of proof here seems to be to give a precise specification of a property, P, which is not referred to by any of il ... .4 and which is such that morally sensitive men could hold that its possession by a person is a bona fide justification of his not preventing an s. Needless to say, this specification will serve the purpose of the theists whom we are presently considering only if P is specified in such a way that (a) we cannot know that an omnipotent and omniscient being would not possess it and (b) the claim that its possession is a justification for not preventing an s is compatible with the claim that 7.... .g4 are the only justifications which are applicable to human beings.
